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The Defence of Responsible 
Communication 
Peter A. Downard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defamatory statements of fact published in mass media give rise to a 
legal problem of particular difficulty. Defamatory statements of fact, as 
distinguished from statements of opinion or inherently debatable com-
ment, purport to assert objective truth.1 When a defamatory statement of 
fact is published by mass media, the breadth of the statement’s dissemi-
nation is likely to maximize the harm to the person defamed. Where a 
mass media publisher is a large and influential corporation, a common-
place in Canadian life, the audience may be more likely to grant 
credibility to the publisher, and believe the defamation is true. 
For the person defamed, the result may be profound harm to interests 
the law of defamation exists to protect: individual reputation, emotional 
security and dignity, and privacy.2 Yet in recent decades there has been an 
                                                                                                             
* Barrister and litigation partner, Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP. This paper is based 
upon a chapter in the second edition of my book, Libel, published this year by LexisNexis Canada. 
1 Statements of opinion or comment may be subject to the defence of fair comment. This is 
discussed further at a later point in this paper. 
2 Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, 2009 SCC 61, at paras. 58-59 (S.C.C.), per 
McLachlin C.J.C; WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 41, 2008 SCC 40, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 
420, at para. 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “WIC Radio”], per Binnie J.; Gilles E. Néron Communication 
Marketing Inc. v. Chambre des notaires du Québec, [2004] S.C.J. No. 50, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 95, at 
para. 54 (S.C.C.), per LeBel J. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that reputation is an 
integral and fundamentally important aspect of every individual, which fosters self-image and self-
worth, and is closely linked to the ability of the individual to participate in Canadian society: Hill v. 
Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at para. 72 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Hill”], per Cory J.; R. v. Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439, at para. 48 
(S.C.C.), per Cory J., and at para. 120, per McLachlin J. (dissenting in part on other grounds). It has 
been observed in the Supreme Court that privacy is at the heart of liberty in the modern state: R. v. 
Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at 427 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J.; Edmonton 
Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, at para. 21 
(S.C.C.), per Cory J. [hereinafter “Edmonton Journal”]. The Supreme Court has recognized a per-
son’s reasonable expectation of privacy as a principle of fundamental justice within the meaning of 
s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, infra, note 5; R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, 
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 62 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ. Privacy may also be consid-
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increasing consciousness among legislators and the judiciary of the im-
portance of freedom of expression in democratic societies. Free 
expression advances intelligent democratic self-government, the deter-
mination of truth and persons’ individual self-fulfillment.3 Freedom of 
expression protects listeners as well as speakers. It requires freedom of 
the press, since the ability of the public to receive information depends 
upon the ability of the press to obtain it and report it to the public.4 
Freedom of expression jurisprudence under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms5 has made clear that expression cases require a re-
fined and searching analysis,6 in which values must be sensitively 
weighed in their context.7 Defamation cases are free speech cases in mi-
crocosm. The depth and importance of the values in conflict equally 
require that the court conduct a sensitive analysis of all relevant facts, 
with a view to arriving at a balanced approach evincing respect for all 
relevant values.8 
Judicial appreciation of the important values at stake on both sides of 
cases involving defamatory statements of fact in mass media has led to 
recognition that the publication of such statements, when they relate to 
subjects of legitimate public interest, should in some circumstances be 
legally protected. As a result, Canadian law as to the availability of a  
                                                                                                             
ered an aspect of the right to liberty in s. 7: R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, at 72 
(S.C.C.), per McLachlin J.  
3 Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at para. 
56, per the Court; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at para. 53 
(S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C., Lamer and Wilson JJ.; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 13, [1990] 3 
S.C.R. 697, at paras. 27 and 87-89 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C., and at paras. 168-182, per McLachlin J. 
(dissenting on other grounds). 
4 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard, [1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421, at 
429-30 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J., and at 451, per McLachlin J. (dissenting on other grounds); Cana-
dian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1991] S.C.J. No. 88, [1991] 3 
S.C.R. 459, at 475 (S.C.C.), per Cory J. As listeners and readers, members of the public have a right 
to information pertaining to governmental, legal and social institutions: Edmonton Journal, supra, 
note 2, at para. 10, per Cory J.; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General) 
(Re R. v. Carson), [1996] S.C.J. No. 38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at para. 23 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J. 
5 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
6 Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 
892, at para. 31 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C. 
7 R. v. Keegstra, supra, note 3, at para. 47, per Dickson C.J.C.; Ross v. New Brunswick 
School District No. 15, [1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, at para. 78 (S.C.C.), per La Forest 
J.; Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] S.C.J. No. 65, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 
232, at para. 28 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin J. 
8 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 
at para. 72 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”], per Lamer C.J.C.; R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, 
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, at para. 23 (S.C.C.), per Iacobucci J.; WIC Radio, supra, note 2, at para. 2, per 
Binnie J.  
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defence of privilege for publications in mass media has been in a state of 
evolution for many years.9 That evolution has led to the recent recogni-
tion by the Supreme Court of Canada, in Grant v. Torstar Corp.,10 of a 
new defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest. 
II. THE LAW PRIOR TO THE CHARTER 
For many years prior to the entrenchment of the Charter in the Cana-
dian Constitution, Canadian courts repeatedly rejected submissions that a 
publication of information in mass media could constitute an occasion of 
qualified privilege at common law.11 That was so regardless of whether 
the subject matter involved the conduct of a person holding public  
office,12 or was otherwise of public interest.13  
In 1952, in Douglas v. Tucker,14 Cartwright J. considered whether there 
was a common law privilege attaching to one elector’s communication to 
                                                                                                             
9 Cusson v. Quan, [2007] O.J. No. 4348, 87 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 44, per Sharpe J.A. 
(Ont. C.A.), revd on other grounds, Quan v. Cusson, [2009] S.C.J. No. 62, 2009 SCC 62 (S.C.C.); 
Lee v. Globe & Mail, [2001] O.J. No. 317, 6 C.P.C. (5th) 354, at para. 19 (Ont. S.C.J.), per Swinton 
J.; Bennett Environmental Inc. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., [2004] O.J. No. 2456, at para. 11 
(Ont. S.C.J.), per Himel J.  
10 Supra, note 2. To declare an interest, I was counsel for the appellant in Grant. 
11 Douglas v. Tucker, [1952] S.C.J. No. 2, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 275, at 287 (S.C.C.), per Cart-
wright J.; Globe and Mail Ltd. v. Boland, [1960] S.C.J. No. 2, [1960] S.C.R. 203 (S.C.C.); Banks v. 
Globe and Mail Ltd., [1961] S.C.J. No. 25, [1961] S.C.R. 474 (S.C.C.); Jones v. Bennett, [1969] 
S.C.J. No. 99, [1969] S.C.R. 277 (S.C.C.). The fact situations to which common law qualified privi-
lege applies are referred to as occasions of qualified privilege: see Minter v. Priest, [1930] A.C. 558, 
at 571-72 (H.L.), per Viscount Dunedin. The common law rule is that an occasion of publication is 
privileged if the publisher has an interest or duty, legal, social, moral or personal, to publish the 
information in issue to the person to whom it is published, and the person to whom it is published 
has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it: see Hill, supra, note 2, at para. 143 (S.C.C.), per 
Cory J.; RTC Engineering Consultants Ltd. v. Ontario (Ministry of the Solicitor General and Cor-
rectional Services), [2002] O.J. No. 1001, 58 O.R. (3d) 726, at 732 (Ont. C.A.), per Laskin J.A. An 
individual publishing a defamatory statement on an occasion of qualified privilege has a defence 
unless the plaintiff can prove malice on the part of the defendant, or that the defendant’s publication 
exceeded the scope of the privilege: see Hill, id., at paras. 144-146, per Cory J.; Botiuk v. Toronto 
Free Press, [1995] S.C.J. No. 69, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 79-80 (S.C.C.), per Cory J. 
12 Douglas v. Tucker, id., at 288, per Cartwright J.; Banks v. Globe and Mail Ltd., id., at 484, 
per Cartwright J.; Doyle v. Sparrow, [1979] O.J. No. 4487, 27 O.R. (2d) 206, at 208 (Ont. C.A.), per 
MacKinnon A.C.J.O.; England v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1979] N.W.T.J. No. 33, 97 D.L.R. 
(3d) 472, at 486 (N.W.T.S.C.), per Tallis J.; Cherneskey v. Armadale Publishers Ltd., [1977] S.J. No. 
230, 79 D.L.R. (3d) 180 (Sask. C.A.), revd on other grounds, [1979] S.C.J. No. 115, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 
1067 (S.C.C.); Bennett v. Stupich, [1981] B.C.J. No. 1856, 125 D.L.R. (3d) 743 (B.C.S.C.); Lawson v. 
Chabot, [1974] B.C.J. No. 578, 48 D.L.R. (3d) 556 (B.C.S.C.); Planned Parenthood Newfound-
land/Labrador v. Fedorik, [1982] N.J. No. 219, 135 D.L.R. (3d) 714 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.). 
13 Lockhart v. Harrison, [1928] All E.R. Rep. 149, at 152 (H.L.), per Lord Buckmaster; 
Silkin v. Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd., [1958] 1 W.L.R. 743, at 746 (H.L.), per Diplock J. 
14 Supra, note 11. 
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another of information regarding a candidate for public office which the 
elector believes to be true, and which is relevant to the candidate’s fitness 
for office. “It is settled,” he stated, “that whatever may be the extent of such 
a privilege it is lost if the publication is made in a newspaper.”15  
In the 1960 case of Globe and Mail Ltd. v. Boland,16 an editorial 
stated that an “independent Conservative” candidate in a federal election 
had put forward an ex-Communist to make statements to the effect that 
the Liberal party was “Soft on Communism”. The candidate was said to 
have done this to mislead immigrant voters. The trial judge held that the 
editorial was published on an occasion of qualified privilege. His finding 
was made on the basis that during a federal election a newspaper has a 
duty to publish political news and comment for the information and 
guidance of the public, and the public has a legitimate and vital interest 
in receiving that information. The Court of Appeal did not interfere. In 
the Supreme Court of Canada, Cartwright J. held that no privilege ap-
plied. He stated: 
[T]he learned trial judge has confused the right which the publisher of a 
newspaper has, in common with all Her Majesty’s subjects, to report 
truthfully and comment fairly upon matters of public interest with a 
duty of the sort which gives rise to an occasion of qualified privilege.17 
Justice Cartwright held that it would not advance the “common con-
venience and welfare of society” to hold that newspaper publications 
relevant to a candidate’s fitness for office are privileged. To do so “would 
mean that every man who offers himself as a candidate must be prepared 
to risk the loss of his reputation without redress” unless the candidate 
could prove malice.18 To require such a sacrifice would “tend to deter 
sensitive and honourable men from seeking public positions of trust and 
responsibility”19 and defeat the public interest in the “maintenance of the 
public character of public men”.20 A finding of privilege would thus “do 
the public more harm than good”.21 Justice Cartwright considered that 
the interests of newspapers and the public in information would be “suf-
ficiently safeguarded” by the availability of the defence of fair comment 
where it is applicable.22 
                                                                                                             
15 Id., at 287-88. 
16 Supra, note 11. 
17 Id., at 207 (emphasis in original). 
18 Id., at 208. 
19 Id., quoting Gatley on Libel and Slander, 4th ed., at 254. 
20 Id., at 209, quoting Campbell v. Spottiswoode (1863), 122 E.R. 288, per Cockburn C.J. 
21 Id., at 208, quoting Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530, at 540 (1893). 
22 Id., at 209. 
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In 1961, in Banks v. Globe and Mail Ltd.,23 the Supreme Court con-
firmed this position. In Banks, the newspaper published a lead editorial 
stating, among other things, that a union leader was a convicted criminal 
whose labour relations efforts had resulted in the dissolution of the mer-
chant marine. The trial judge (who had also presided in Boland) held that 
qualified privilege is applicable to “editorial comment by a metropolitan 
newspaper upon matters of public interest”.24 The Court of Appeal did 
not interfere. In the Supreme Court, Cartwright J. reversed the trial 
judge’s ruling. He repeated his statement in Boland that the press stands 
on the same footing as any citizen.25 He dismissed as “untenable” the 
proposition that, 
given proof of the existence of a subject-matter of wide public interest 
throughout Canada without proof of any other special circumstances, 
any newspaper in Canada (and semble therefore any individual) which 
sees fit to publish to the public at large statements of fact relevant to 
that subject-matter is to be held to be doing so on an occasion of 
qualified privilege. …26 
The issue of privilege for mass communications came before the Su-
preme Court again in 1969, in Jones v. Bennett.27 In Jones, the plaintiff 
had been chairman of a provincial commission responsible for purchas-
ing supplies needed by the public service. He was charged criminally 
with unlawfully accepting benefits, but was acquitted after a trial. While 
a Crown appeal on a point of law was pending, the provincial govern-
ment introduced in the legislature a bill to provide for the deemed 
retirement of the plaintiff. While the bill was under debate in the legisla-
ture, the defendant, the Premier of British Columbia, spoke to a meeting 
of his political party. Newspaper reporters were visibly in attendance. He 
said, “I’m not going to talk about the Jones boy. I could say a lot, but let 
me just assure you of this; the position taken by the government is the 
right position.” Shortly afterward, the Crown appeal was struck out as 
being frivolous. The plaintiff then sued the Premier over his statement at 
the meeting.  
In the Supreme Court, Cartwright J., now Chief Justice, rejected the 
Premier’s argument that “whenever the holder of high elective political 
                                                                                                             
23 Supra, note 12. 
24 Id., at 481. 
25 Id., at 482. 
26 Id., at 484. 
27 Supra, note 11. 
164 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
office sees fit to give an account of his stewardship and of the actions of 
the government of which he is a member to supporters of the political 
party which he belongs he is speaking on an occasion of qualified privi-
lege”.28 Chief Justice Cartwright considered this to be an attempt to 
extend to the Premier a recognized privilege attaching to communica-
tions from one elector to other electors regarding matters relevant to the 
question of a candidate’s fitness for office, which the speaker honestly 
believes to be true. Although he was “far from deciding” that such an 
extension was warranted, Cartwright C.J.C. held that the argument was 
in any event defeated by the fact that newspaper reporters were visibly 
present at the meeting.29 The claim to privilege failed given that “a plea 
of qualified privilege based on a ground of the sort relied on in the case 
at bar cannot be upheld where the words complained of are published to 
the public generally or, as it is sometimes expressed, ‘to the world’”.30 
It remains that a path of liberalization in mass media cases has never 
been entirely closed. In Banks, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowl-
edged that in some circumstances a publication to the public at large may 
be privileged at common law.31 These included circumstances in which an 
individual had been attacked in the public press. The attack entitled the 
individual to make a privileged response to the same audience.32 It was 
also acknowledged, based on English precedents, that privilege would ap-
ply to a publication of a medical tribunal that a doctor’s name had been 
erased from a medical register, on the ground that there was a duty “to give 
the public accurate information as to who is on the register and if the per-
son’s name is erased accurate information of the cause of its erasure”.33 In 
Littleton v. Hamilton, Dubin J.A., while stating that a subject of public in-
terest alone is insufficient to justify a finding of privilege, contemplated 
the possibility of facts being proven which could give rise to “valid social 
reasons” and a “special duty” justifying a qualified privilege.34  
Through the cautious expansion of recognized duties and interests, 
Canadian courts subsequently allowed some incremental expansion of 
qualified privilege. This was most notable in a series of cases involving 
                                                                                                             
28 Id., at 284. 
29 On this point see also Lawson v. Chabot, supra, note 12. 
30 Jones v. Bennett, supra, note 11, at 284-85. 
31 Banks v. Globe and Mail Ltd., supra, note 11, at 483, per Cartwright J.  
32 Id., at 483, per Cartwright J., citing Adam v. Ward, [1917] A.C. 309 (H.L.). 
33 Id., at 483-84, per Cartwright J., citing Allbutt v. General Council of Medical Education 
and Registration (1889), 23 Q.B.D. 400. 
34 Littleton v. Hamilton, [1974] O.J. No. 1955, 4 O.R. (2d) 283, at 284-85 (Ont. C.A.), per 
Dubin J.A.  
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statements by public officials. In 1979, in Stopforth v. Goyer, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal held that a federal minister spoke to the media on an 
occasion of qualified privilege when he stated that a senior civil servant 
had been demoted for “misinformation or gross negligence” in connec-
tion with a matter that had been the subject of extensive questioning in 
the House of Commons.35 Justice Jessup stated: 
In my opinion the electorate, as represented by the media, has a real 
and bona fide interest in the demotion of a senior civil servant for an 
alleged dereliction of duty. It would want to know if the reasons given 
in the House were the real and only reasons for the demotion. The 
appellant had a corresponding public duty and interest in satisfying that 
interest of the electorate. Accordingly, there being no suggestion of 
malice, I would hold that the alleged defamatory statements were 
uttered on an occasion of qualified privilege.36 
The conclusion that the words were spoken in the discharge of a duty 
was clearly a conclusion of policy by the appellate court. The trial judge 
had noted the defendant’s admission in cross-examination that he did not 
speak the defamatory words because he felt he had a duty to do so.37 
In Loos v. Robbins,38 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal found an oc-
casion of qualified privilege where a Minister of the provincial Crown 
made statements to the media regarding grounds for the dismissal of cer-
tain civil servants that cast doubt on their competence. In reaching this 
conclusion the court recognized a duty of a Minister to make a statement 
to the public about a matter of public interest regarding his or her de-
partment, when members of the public at large would have no such 
duty.39 
In Parlett v. Robinson,40 a Member of Parliament alleged at a news 
conference that the plaintiff had purchased products manufactured by a 
federal inmate and made a profit on their sale, thus exploiting inmate 
labour for his own profit. The defendant was the official spokesperson 
for his party on the relevant ministry. He only spoke out after receiving a 
constituent’s complaint and failing to persuade the responsible minister 
to investigate. The court held that these circumstances gave rise to a duty 
                                                                                                             
35 [1979] O.J. No. 4128, 23 O.R. (2d) 696 (Ont. C.A.). 
36 Id., at 699-700. 
37 [1978] O.J. No. 3432, 87 D.L.R. (3d) 373, at 383 (Ont. H.C.J.). 
38 [1987] S.J. No. 237, 37 D.L.R. (4th) 418 (Sask. C.A.). 
39 Id., at 423-24, per Gerwing J.A.  
40 [1986] B.C.J. No. 594, 30 D.L.R. (4th) 247 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Parlett”]. 
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to speak publicly that was sufficient to ground qualified privilege. Justice 
Hinkson stated:  
When he failed to persuade the Minister to order the inquiry, if he held 
an honest belief that there had been impropriety within the Correctional 
Service with respect to taking advantage of the work of inmates, then it 
was the duty of the defendant to ventilate his concerns in a way that 
would persuade the Minister to have an investigation conducted into 
the matter.41 
The court held that the “electorate in Canada” had a reciprocal “interest 
in knowing whether the administration of the Correctional Service is be-
ing properly conducted by the officials in the Department of the Solicitor 
General”.42 
In Baumann v. Turner,43 a British Columbia mayor was a proponent 
of the use of a particular source of water for his municipality. A citizen 
who was a professional engineer opposed him on this public issue. As a 
result of a letter from the engineer to the relevant ministry, a decision 
was made at the provincial level to oppose the mayor’s position. A letter 
to this effect was sent to the mayor by the ministry. The mayor subse-
quently learned that the editor of the local newspaper had a copy of the 
letter. The mayor wrote a letter to the relevant minister, which he pro-
vided to the newspaper. In his letter the mayor accused the citizen of 
having “misused his Professional Engineer’s certification in a political 
manner which is eroding my, and the community’s confidence in the 
competency and credibility of the Professional Engineer’s Association of 
B.C.” He went on to say that he had not proceeded with a complaint to 
the professional association about the citizen because council members 
“felt that the consequences to [the citizen] may be too severe in that he 
could lose his job and ability to provide for his young family”. The 
newspaper did not republish the statement, but the citizen sued the mayor 
for his limited publication of the letter. A majority of the British Colum-
                                                                                                             
41 Id., at 256. 
42 Id., at 256. In McCartan Turkington Breen v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 277 
(H.L.) [hereinafter “McCartan”], Lord Cooke stated (at 301) that Parlett is “entirely consistent with” 
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.), discussed infra, note 75ff. [hereinafter 
“Reynolds”]. In Grant v. Torstar Corp., supra, note 2, at para. 35, McLachlin C.J.C. cited Parlett 
and observed that “in suits against politicians expressing concerns to the electorate about the conduct 
of other public figures, courts have sometimes recognized that a politician’s ‘duty to ventilate’ mat-
ters of concern to the public could give rise to qualified privilege …”. 
43 [1993] B.C.J. No. 1649, 105 D.L.R. (4th) 37 (B.C.C.A.). 
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bia Court of Appeal applied Parlett to hold that the mayor’s publication 
of the letter was privileged. For the majority, Legg J.A. stated: 
When Turner became aware on April 27th from his discussions with 
Shari Bishop, the editor of the Squamish Times that the newspaper had 
received a copy of the letter from the Minister to the appellant, he had a 
bona fide interest in ensuring that his response to the Minister’s 
opposition to the Mashiter Creek Project was in the hands of the 
newspaper so that his disagreement with the Minister and [the citizen] 
could be available through the newspaper to his constituents.44 
The mayor’s constituents were held to have had a bona fide reciprocal 
interest in knowing of the mayor’s opposition. In dissent, Southin J.A. 
held that the particular source of water used was a public issue, “but 
whether [the citizen] was abusing the standards of his profession was 
not”, and publication to the newspaper was therefore unprotected.45 The 
reasons of the majority in Baumann appear to treat the case as an in-
stance of a privileged reply to criticism, in accordance with the 
traditional common law principle referred to by Cartwright J. in Banks.46 
In Camporese v. Parton,47 the British Columbia Supreme Court used 
an analysis of special factual circumstances to find an occasion of quali-
fied privilege where a defamatory statement had been published in a 
newspaper. In Camporese, a newspaper columnist had commended the 
goods of the plaintiff to her readers. The columnist came to honestly be-
lieve that those goods posed a health risk. It was apparent that if the 
columnist’s belief was correct, her readers could be endangered. They 
could have been misled by her previous column unless it was corrected. 
The court held that the columnist had a duty to communicate this infor-
                                                                                                             
44 Id., at 56. 
45 Id., at 51. In Bridge Structural and Ornamental and Reinforcing Ironworkers v. Liberal 
Party of British Columbia, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2357, 152 D.L.R. (4th) 547 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter 
“B.S.O.I.W”], the British Columbia Supreme Court held that a media release provided to a legislative 
press gallery by an opposition party was published on an occasion of qualified privilege. Justice 
Macdonald stated (at 557) that opposition politicians “have both a duty and an interest to investigate 
and expose any impropriety or irregularity in the management of government monies by the gov-
ernment of the day, and to communicate their findings to the electorate”, which has “a corresponding 
interest in receiving such information”. The court declined to extend the benefit of this privilege to 
the media. B.S.O.I.W., appears to be inconsistent with the earlier decision of the British Columbia 
Supreme Court in Lawson v. Chabot, supra, note 12. In Lawson, it was held that a provincial minis-
ter was not protected by privilege where he made statements regarding a union’s position regarding a 
mediation commission because he made the statements to media representatives, and thus to the 
world at large. 
46 Banks v. Globe and Mail Ltd., supra, note 11, at 483, per Cartwright J., citing Adam v. 
Ward, supra, note 32. 
47 [1983] B.C.J. No 2464, 150 D.L.R. (3d) 208 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Camporese”]. 
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mation to her readers that was sufficient to ground a finding of qualified 
privilege. Camporese may be argued to be within a class of cases con-
templated by Stephenson L.J. of the English Court of Appeal in 
Blackshaw v. Lord48 as possibly giving rise to an occasion of privilege at 
common law. In Blackshaw, Stephenson L.J. stated: 
There may be extreme cases where the urgency of communicating a 
warning is so great, or the source of the information so reliable, that 
publication of suspicion or speculation is justified; for example, where 
there is danger to the public from a suspected terrorist or the 
distribution of contaminated food or drugs …49 
III. THE CHARTER AND HILL V. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY 
The sequence of liberalizing decisions described above coincided 
with the entrenchment of the Charter in the Constitution of Canada, in-
cluding its guarantee of a fundamental freedom of expression, and the 
development of a richer body of freedom of expression jurisprudence 
than had previously existed in Canadian constitutional law.50 
It is well established that the Charter only applies to the common law 
where the government relies upon the common law as authorizing gov-
ernment action that allegedly infringes a guaranteed right or freedom.51 
Private parties owe each other no constitutional duties and cannot found 
a cause of action upon a Charter right.52 The Supreme Court has never-
theless made clear that the judiciary ought to apply and develop the 
principles of the common law in a manner consistent with the fundamen-
tal values enshrined in the Constitution, including the Charter.53 Thus, a 
party to private civil litigation can argue that a principle of the common 
law is inconsistent with Charter values.54 Although it is the legislatures, 
and not the courts, that have major responsibility for law reform in a con-
stitutional democracy, the courts may make incremental revisions to the 
                                                                                                             
48 [1983] 2 All E.R. 311 (C.A.) 
49 Id., at 327. 
50 R. v. Keegstra, supra, note 3, at para. 26, per Dickson C.J.C. 
51 R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 598-99 
(S.C.C.), per McIntyre J. [hereinafter “Dolphin Delivery”]; Hill, supra, note 2, at para. 83, per Cory J. 
52 Hill, id., at para. 95, per Cory J. 
53 Dolphin Delivery, supra, note 51, at 603, per McIntyre J.; Hill, id., at para. 91, per Cory J. 
54 Hill, id., at paras. 95-98, per Cory J. See also R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 
3 S.C.R. 654, at 675 (S.C.C.), per Iacobucci J. 
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common law to bring it into compliance with values enunciated in the 
Charter.55 
The first major effort to modify qualified privilege after the en-
trenchment of the Charter was made in Hill v. Church of Scientology of 
Toronto.56 In Hill it was argued in the Supreme Court of Canada that the 
values underlying the Charter require the adoption of the approach to 
libel claims by public officials that was established by the United States 
Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan.57 The central holding in 
Sullivan was that the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech 
and the press in the Constitution of the United States requires that a pub-
lic official be prohibited from recovering damages for a defamatory 
falsehood relating to his or her official conduct unless it is proven that 
the statement was made with actual malice, and in particular, knowledge 
that it was false, or reckless disregard whether it was true or false.58 
The Supreme Court unanimously declined to adopt the Sullivan ap-
proach. Justice Cory observed that Sullivan was a creature of its 
historical moment, in which a dramatic remedy was necessary to protect 
the civil rights movement in the southern United States.59 He considered 
undesirable consequences said to have resulted from Sullivan, including 
the added cost and complexity of inquiries into the existence of malice, 
uncertainties as to who is a public official, and the effect the rule may 
have of “deprecating truth in public discourse”.60 
Justice Cory held that defamatory statements are only “very tenu-
ously related” to the values underlying the Charter’s guarantee of 
freedom of expression. He described defamatory statements as “inimical 
to the search for truth”, and incapable of enhancing individual self-
development or participation in public affairs.61 He considered such 
statements to be harmful to the interests of a free and democratic  
                                                                                                             
55 WIC Radio, supra, note 2, at paras. 16, 36, per Binnie J.; Hill, id., at paras. 91-92, per 
Cory J.; Salituro, id., at 675, per Iacobucci J.; Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 
558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156, at paras. 19-
20 and 106 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J.; Dagenais, supra, note 8, at paras. 69-73, per 
Lamer C.J.C.; R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 57 (S.C.C.), per McLach-
lin and Iacobucci JJ. 
56 Hill, id. 
57 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [hereinafter “Sullivan”]. The history of the case is reviewed in An-
thony Lewis, Make No Law (New York: Random House, 1991). 
58 Id., at 254-55, per Brennan J. 
59 Id., at 1180-81. 
60 Id., at 1182-83. 
61 Hill, supra, note 2, at 1174. 
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society.62 Justice Cory also referred with approval to past concerns that 
privilege for the publication of defamatory statements regarding the fit-
ness for public office of a person would deter “sensitive and honourable 
men” from seeking public office.63 Justice Cory said that no compelling 
circumstances existed which required that the common law be modified 
so as to afford individuals less protection from defamation under the 
Charter. He stated: 
Surely it is not requiring too much of individuals that they ascertain the 
truth of the allegations they publish … Those who publish statements 
should assume a reasonable level of responsibility.64 
Notwithstanding the restrained approach of the Supreme Court in 
Hill, two years later the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a successful 
plea of qualified privilege by a media defendant in Grenier v. Southam 
Inc.65 The court’s decision on the point is perfunctory, and the material 
facts not apparent. The trial judge’s brief reasons on the issue were deliv-
ered orally. He considered that the evidence was “overwhelming” that the 
defendant newspaper had a “social and moral purpose” in writing the 
article in question. The gist of the article was that persons could get help 
when a member of their family had become obsessed with gospel 
preachers. The trial judge held that the reporter “had absolutely no mali-
cious intent”, and “properly researched her material and believed that 
what she wrote was true”.66 In its brief endorsement, the Court of Appeal 
stated only that “the trial judge specifically found on the evidence before 
him that there was a social and moral duty on the respondent to publish 
the article in question”, and “made no error” in finding that the article 
was published on an occasion of qualified privilege.67  
In the same year, in Moises v. Canadian Newspaper Co., the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal rejected an argument that Charter values re-
quired recognition of privilege where “words are published in good faith 
and the publisher carried out its duties in a responsible fashion and pub-
lished a fair and balanced story”.68 
                                                                                                             
62 Id. 
63 Id., at 1174-75.  
64 Id., at 1187. 
65 [1997] O.J. No. 2193 (Ont. C.A.). 
66 Transcript of supplementary reasons of Houston J. in Grenier v. Southam Inc., August 27, 
1993. 
67 Supra, note 65, at para. 7, per the Court (McKinlay, Catzman and Rosenberg JJ.A.). 
68 [1996] B.C.J. No. 1205, [1997] 1 W.W.R. 337, at 343, 348-53 (B.C.C.A.), per Williams 
J.A.  
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IV. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION AND REYNOLDS V.  
TIMES NEWSPAPERS 
Since 1998 the United Kingdom has experienced a re-evaluation of 
its laws affecting important individual freedoms, similar to the experi-
ence of Canada under the Charter. This has followed from the 
incorporation into the United Kingdom’s domestic law of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms.69 The United Kingdom Human Rights Act 199870 requires that 
domestic courts have particular regard to freedom of expression in rele-
vant cases, and that they develop and apply the common law in a manner 
consistent with the guarantee of freedom of expression in the European 
Convention.71 The Human Rights Act 1998 also requires that domestic 
                                                                                                             
69 (1953) Cmnd 8969 [hereinafter “European Convention”]. 
70 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42, in force October 2000. 
71 Article 10 of the European Convention provides: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. ... 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territo-
rial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
Section 12 of the U.K. Human Rights Act 1998 provides: 
Freedom of Expression 
(1) This section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if 
granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression.  
(2) If the person against whom the application for relief is made (“the respondent”) is 
neither present nor represented, no such relief is to be granted unless the court is 
satisfied–  
(a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or  
(b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified.  
(3) No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court 
is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed.  
(4) The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to 
freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material which the respondent 
claims, or which appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material (or to 
conduct connected with such material), to–  
(a) the extent to which–  
(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or  
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published;  
(b) any relevant privacy code.  
(5) In this section–  
“court” includes a tribunal; and 
“relief” includes any remedy or order (other than in criminal proceedings). 
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courts take into account relevant decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights.72 
Prior to the United Kingdom’s adoption of the European Convention 
as part of domestic law, there were signs in its jurisprudence, as in Can-
ada’s, that further expansion of common law privilege to protect 
publications in the public interest could be possible. Most notably, in the 
1983 case of Blackshaw v. Lord,73 Stephenson L.J. contemplated the ex-
pansion of qualified privilege to cover a communication to the general 
public where the particular facts of the case could be said to give rise to a 
sufficient reciprocal duty and interest. He stated: 
Public interest and public benefit are necessary … but not enough 
without more. There must be a duty to publish to the public at large and 
an interest in the public at large to receive the publication; and a section 
of the public is not enough. 
The subject matter must be of public interest; its publication must be in 
the public interest. That nature of the matter published and its source 
and the position or status of the publisher distributing the information 
must be such as to create the duty to publish the information to the 
intended recipients … Where damaging facts have been ascertained to 
be true, or been made the subject of a report, there may be a duty to 
report them … But where damaging allegations or charges have been 
made and are still under investigation … or have been authoritatively 
refuted … there can be no duty to report them to the public.74 
1. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers 
In 1999, an analysis of this type was developed and adopted by the 
House of Lords in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd.75 In Reynolds, the 
former prime minister of Ireland sued over a newspaper article. He said 
the article accused him of deliberately misleading the Irish legislature 
and lying to colleagues in a coalition government. The House of Lords, 
                                                                                                             
Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1988 also authorizes courts to declare the incompatibility of 
legislation with the European Convention. Section 4(6) provides, however, that such a declaration 
does not result in the law being invalid and unenforceable, as is the case under the Constitution of 
Canada where the Charter is contravened. 
72 Human Rights Act 1998, s. 2. Subsection 6(1) provides: “It is unlawful for a public 
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right”, subject to exceptions 
specified in subs. 6(2). Subsection 6(3) defines “public authority” as including “a court or tribunal”. 
73 Supra, note 48. 
74 Id., at 327. 
75 Supra, note 42. 
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like the Supreme Court of Canada in Hill, was asked to accept a broad 
submission. It was that qualified privilege should apply to all media publi-
cations arising out of the discussion of political matters concerning the 
conduct of government in a democratic society.76 The Law Lords rejected 
the submission. They held that the proposed rule provided inadequate pro-
tection for reputation. The submission was also considered to be unsound 
in principle, as it would protect political speech, but not speech on other 
matters of serious public concern.77 The Law Lords nevertheless broad-
ened the availability of qualified privilege on a different basis. 
To Lord Nicholls, the author of the lead opinion in Reynolds, the case 
involved the interaction of “two fundamental rights: freedom of expres-
sion and protection of reputation”.78 He emphasized the importance of 
freedom of expression in representative democracy, the incorporation of 
the European Convention in United Kingdom domestic law, and the im-
portant role of media in communicating information and comment on 
matters of public interest.79 He equally recognized that “reputation is an 
integral and important part of the dignity of the individual”, that a reputa-
tion damaged in national media may be damaged forever, and that the 
protection of reputation is conducive to the public good.80 He observed 
that the European Convention’s guarantee of freedom of expression was 
subject to “such restrictions as are prescribed by law and are necessary in 
a democratic society for the protection of the reputations of others”.81 
Weighing these considerations, the Law Lords unanimously held that 
the concepts of duty and interest may in some circumstances be applied 
to justify a finding of a privileged occasion for the communication to the 
public of information in the public interest.82 The burden of proof of facts 
                                                                                                             
76 Id., at 200, per Lord Nicholls; at 209, per Lord Steyn; at 218, per Lord Cooke; and at 
227-28, per Lord Hope. See also the report of counsel’s argument in the House of Lords, at 180. 
77 Id., at 204, per Lord Nicholls; see also Lord Cooke, at 218-20, and Lord Hobhouse, at 
239. 
78 Id., at 190, per Lord Nicholls. 
79 Id., at 200, per Lord Nicholls. See also id., at 207-208, per Lord Steyn, and at 223, per 
Lord Cooke. See also McCartan, supra, note 42, at 300, per Lord Cooke.  
80 Reynolds, id., at 201, per Lord Nicholls. 
81 Id., at 201, per Lord Nicholls. 
82 Id., at 202, per Lord Nicholls; at 213, per Lord Steyn; at 225, per Lord Cooke; at 234-35, 
per Lord Hope; and at 240, per Lord Hobhouse. In Lange v. Atkinson, [1999] UKPC 46, at para. 15, 
Lord Nicholls stated that  
the established common law approach to the publication of misstatements of fact to the 
general public remains essentially sound. Whether such a publication is in the public in-
terest or, in the conventional phraseology, whether there is a duty to publish to the 
intended recipients, depends upon the circumstances, including the nature of the matter 
published and its source or status.  
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supporting a privileged occasion would be on the defendant,83 and the 
question whether the occasion was privileged would be one of law for 
the judge.84 Lord Nicholls stated that, in media cases, privilege could be 
available if the publication met the standard of “responsible journalism, a 
standard which the media themselves espouse”.85 He identified 10 spe-
cific factors relevant to the determination whether there has been a duty 
to publish, and a corresponding legitimate interest of the public in receiv-
ing the information:86 
1. The seriousness of the allegation. The more serious the charge, 
the more the public is misinformed, and the individual harmed, if 
the allegation is not true.87 
2. The nature of the information. The information itself, and the 
extent to which the subject matter is of public concern, should be 
considered.88 Political matters are clearly of public interest. In ad-
dition, politicians inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to 
close scrutiny of their every word and deed by journalists and the 
public at large. Lord Steyn added that speech about political mat-
ters should have a “higher value” for the purpose of qualified 
privilege analysis than “speech about private lives of politicians”.89 
In this area, however, it is also argued that protection of reputation 
in political life is conducive to the public good, since if the reputa-
tion of a public figure is debased falsely the public will be 
prevented from accurately assessing him or her.90 
3. The source of the information. The court should consider 
whether the source has no direct knowledge of events, a bias (“an 
axe to grind”), or is being paid.91 In political matters, the court 
should not prefer information derived from a government source 
over a source opposed to the government.92 
                                                                                                             
83 Id., at 203, per Lord Nicholls; and 239, per Lord Hobhouse. 
84 Id., at 205, per Lord Nicholls; at 215-16, per Lord Steyn; at 226, per Lord Cooke; and at 
236, per Lord Hope. See also McCartan, supra, note 42, at 302, per Lord Cooke. 
85 Id., at 202, per Lord Nicholls.  
86 Id., at 205, per Lord Nicholls. 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  
89 Id., at 215, per Lord Steyn. 
90 Id., at 201, per Lord Nicholls; see also 213, per Lord Steyn; and 238, per Lord Hobhouse. 
91 Id. at 205, per Lord Nicholls. See also GKR Karate (UK) Ltd. v. Yorkshire Post Newspa-
pers Ltd., [2000] 2 All E.R. 931, at 938-39 (C.A.), per May L.J. [hereinafter “GKR Karate”]. 
92 Reynolds, supra, note 42, at 213, per Lord Steyn. 
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4. Steps taken to verify the information. The court should take into 
account whether the defendant has taken steps to verify the accu-
racy of information.93 The court may also consider what inquiries 
have been made to determine the reliability of a source.94 Lord 
Nicholls has subsequently stated that responsible journalism de-
mands that if the media propose to publish a defamatory 
imputation, they should have some factual basis for it.95 A similar 
objection may be taken where a journalist has published material 
that does not rise above the quality of rumour.96 In Reynolds, Lord 
Hobhouse stated that privilege could not apply “to speculation 
however intelligent”, let alone “casual gossip overheard by a jour-
nalist”.97 
   Subsequent to the decision in Reynolds, in Loutchansky v. Times 
Newspapers Ltd., the English Court of Appeal held that the burden 
on the defendant is to show that the occasion of the publication 
was privileged on the basis of the facts known to the defendant at 
the time of publication.98 Justice Brooke stated: 
It was at the moment of publication that the defendants had to 
decide whether, given the information available to them then and 
the extent of the inquiries they had then made, they could 
properly consider they were under a duty to tell the public what 
they wrote about Mr. Loutchansky in their articles. They would 
of course have had to consider whether their sources would have 
                                                                                                             
93 Id., at 205, per Lord Nicholls; at 214, per Lord Steyn; at 225, per Lord Cooke. 
94 Id., at 205, per Lord Nicholls. See also Grobbelaar v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., 
[2001] 2 All E.R. 437, at 446 (C.A.), per Simon Brown L.J., and at 484, per Jonathan Parker J., revd 
on other grounds at [2002] 4 All E.R. 732 (H.L.). 
95 Bonnick v. Morris, [2003] 1 A.C. 300, at 308 (P.C.), per Lord Nicholls. 
96 In Seaga v. Harper, [2008] 1 All E.R. 965 (P.C.), the Privy Council held that a defence 
based on Reynolds privilege was not available where a politician made defamatory statements on the 
basis of information received from third parties, without questioning his sources as to the foundation 
for their information or carrying out any other investigation. Lord Carswell held (at 972) that the 
defendant had “failed to take sufficient care to check the reliability of the information which he 
disseminated”, which did not “rise above mere rumour”. The judges agreed with the trial judge’s 
conclusion that “merely to rely on the conclusions of the thought processes of other people without 
demonstrating the validity of those conclusions was ‘inadequate at best’” (see 972, per Lord 
Carswell). 
97 Supra, note 42, at 238-39, per Lord Hobhouse; Bonnick v. Morris, supra, note 95, at 310, 
per Lord Nicholls. 
98  [2001] 4 All E.R. 115, at 128 (C.A.), per Brooke L.J. See also GKR Karate, supra, note 
91, at 938, per May L.J.  
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appeared to be reliable to reasonable and responsible journalists 
…99 
 Sir Martin Nourse stated: 
If a defendant acts on the basis of facts which he honestly and 
reasonably believes to be true, but which are later found to have 
been, through no fault of his own, untrue, he will not be deprived 
of his defence. Equally, facts which are unknown to him at the 
time of publication cannot have any bearing on the question 
whether he is under the requisite duty at that time.100 
   In Bonnick v. Morris,101 the Privy Council agreed with this ap-
proach. In addition, Lord Nicholls observed that in some cases an 
allegedly defamatory statement may be framed in ambiguous 
terms, capable of both defamatory and non-defamatory interpreta-
tions. He held that if a defamatory meaning arises only by 
implication as a result of an ambiguous statement, that ambiguity 
may be taken into account in deciding whether a publisher has only 
been mistaken as to the meaning the words would likely be under-
stood to bear, and has nevertheless acted responsibly.102 Lord 
Nicholls stated that this approach should not be taken too far, how-
ever. He said ambiguity is best avoided as much as possible, and 
that the media should not be allowed to use ambiguity as a “screen 
behind which a journalist is ‘willing to wound, and yet afraid to 
strike’”.103 The more obvious and serious a defamatory meaning, 
the less weight the court should attach to other possible mean-
ings.104 
5. The status of the information. The court should consider whether 
the information has particular status, such as where it has been pro-
duced by “an investigation which commands respect”.105 A 
defendant may not have acted responsibly, for example, where it 
has simply purchased sensational information from a source with a 
                                                                                                             
99 Id., at 135. 
100 Id., at 137. 
101 Supra, note 95. 
102 Id., at 310, per Lord Nicholls. 
103 Id., at 310, per Lord Nicholls. 
104 Reynolds, supra, note 42, at 205, per Lord Nicholls. 
105 GKR Karate, supra, note 91, at 939, per May L.J.  
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view to commercial profit, rather than having engaged in a sub-
stantial investigation.106 
6. Urgency. The court should consider that “news is often a perish-
able commodity”, and that even a short delay in publication may 
deprive it of value and interest.107 A publication motivated only by 
a desire to increase readership is unlikely to be protected.108 
7. Whether comment has been sought from the plaintiff. The 
court should consider whether the plaintiff’s comment has been 
sought, since the plaintiff may have information others do not pos-
sess or have not disclosed.109 In Reynolds, Lord Nicholls stated that 
such an approach will not always be necessary, but in some cases 
the failure to report a plaintiff’s side of the matter may be a 
weighty factor in determining whether privilege is available.110 It 
has subsequently been observed that the manner in which comment 
from the plaintiff has been sought may also be appropriately con-
sidered. The court may consider, for example, where the plaintiff 
has been “ambushed” immediately prior to publication, in a man-
ner that appears intended to put the plaintiff in discomfort and at a 
disadvantage.111 The court may also properly consider whether the 
defendant has adequately put to the plaintiff the allegations it in-
tended to publish.112 
8. Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of 
the story. Whether or not the plaintiff has been approached for 
comment, the court should consider whether the gist of the plain-
tiff’s position has been stated. Where serious allegations are 
presented as fact and all reference to the plaintiff’s explanation is 
knowingly omitted from a publication, this alone may be sufficient 
to defeat a claim that the occasion of publication was privileged.113 
Although a journalist is entitled to disbelieve and refute explana-
tions given, this does not entitle the journalist to make no mention 
                                                                                                             
106 Reynolds, supra, note 42, at 205, per Lord Nicholls; at 215, per Lord Steyn. 
107 Id., at 224, per Lord Cooke. 
108 Id., at 205, per Lord Nicholls. 
109 Id., at 205, per Lord Nicholls; at 213-14, per Lord Steyn. 
110 Id., at 205, 206, per Lord Nicholls. 
111 Galloway v. Telegraph Group Ltd., [2006] EWCA Civ 17, at para. 75 (C.A.), per Sir An-
thony Clarke M.R.  
112 Id., at paras. 42-44, per Sir Anthony Clarke M.R.  
113 Reynolds, supra, note 42, at 206, per Lord Nicholls. 
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of the plaintiff’s explanation.114 Lord Nicholls stated that “elemen-
tary fairness” normally requires that publication of a serious charge 
should be accompanied by the gist of any explanation given. Al-
though a failure to report the explanation remains only a factor in 
the analysis of all the circumstances, Lord Nicholls considered that 
an article that fails to do so “faces an uphill task in claiming privi-
lege” if the allegation proves to be false and the explanation 
true.115 
9. The tone of the article. The court should consider the tone of the 
article. A newspaper is free to raise questions or call for an investi-
gation, but it is not appropriate to adopt allegations as statements 
of fact.116 A restrained and neutral tone may weigh in favour of a 
finding of privilege.117 
10. The circumstances of the publication. The court should consider 
the circumstances of publication, including the timing.118 It should 
be kept in mind that journalists act without the benefit of hindsight, 
and that matters obvious in retrospect “may have been far from clear 
in the heat of the moment”.119 Where the situation is one in which 
there are only “lingering doubts”, the issue is appropriately resolved 
in favour of publication and a finding of a privileged occasion.120 It 
has since been suggested, however, that timing may not support a 
conclusion that qualified privilege applies where publication has 
been timed solely to suit the defendant’s own purposes.121 Whether 
the required standard has been met by the media in a particular case 
is for the court, and not the journalist, to decide. 
In 2005, in Panday v. Gordon,122 Lord Nicholls stated generally that 
in cases of publications on matters of public interest,  
                                                                                                             
114 Id., at 203, per Lord Nicholls. See also at 213-14, per Lord Steyn, suggesting that a “fail-
ure to report the other side” will often be evidence tending to show that the occasion ought not to be 
protected by qualified privilege, but that may not always be so, such as where a person’s explanation 
is “unintelligible or plain nonsense”. See also Bonnick v. Morris, supra, note 95, at 308, per Lord 
Nicholls. 
115 Id., at 206, per Lord Nicholls. 
116 Bonnick v. Morris, supra, note 95, at 310, per Lord Nicholls. 
117 Reynolds, supra, note 42, at 205, per Lord Nicholls. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id., at 224, per Lord Cooke. 
121 Id., at 202-203, per Lord Nicholls; see also at 239, per Lord Hobhouse. 
122 [2006] 1 A.C. 427 (P.C.). 
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[w]hat is needed is that the area of privilege should be extended but, as 
a counter-balance, those who make statements at large on matters of 
public concern and seek to avail themselves of this extended area of 
privilege, in addition to acting honestly, should exercise a degree of 
care. This objective requirement should be elastic, enabling a court to 
have due regard to all the circumstances, including the importance of 
the subject matter of the statement, the gravity of the allegation, and the 
context in which it is made.123 
2. Jameel v. Wall Street Journal 
In 2006, in Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe Srpl,124 the House 
of Lords reaffirmed the extension of privilege formulated in Reynolds. In 
Jameel, a Saudi Arabian businessman had been named by the Wall Street 
Journal as a person whose companies’ bank accounts were being moni-
tored by the Kingdom’s central bank to prevent them from being used, 
with his knowledge or not, for the funnelling of funds to terrorist organi-
zations. On the evening before publication the newspaper attempted to 
contact the businessman for comment. It was told he was not available. 
The newspaper was requested to postpone publication so that the busi-
nessman might comment. The newspaper declined to do so, but reported 
that the businessman could not be reached for comment. For this reason, 
the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s ruling that Reynolds privi-
lege was not available to the newspaper.125 The House of Lords reversed 
and dismissed the plaintiff’s action. The Law Lords considered that the 
refusal of the newspaper to wait for the businessman’s comment was in-
sufficient to deprive it of the Reynolds defence because the businessman 
would not likely have been in a position to verify whether or not the cen-
tral bank was monitoring his accounts, and the newspaper’s inability to 
obtain comment had been reported.126 The newspaper had also obtained 
verification of the published information from the United States Depart-
ment of the Treasury.127 
                                                                                                             
123 Id., at para. 14. 
124 [2007] 1 A.C. 359 (H.L.) [hereinafter “Jameel”]. 
125 Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl (No. 2), [2005] EWCA Civ. 74, at paras. 88-
89 (C.A.), per Lord Phillips M.R. 
126 Jameel, supra, note 124, at para. 35, per Lord Bingham; see also paras. 83-84, per Lord 
Hoffmann; and para. 139, per Lord Scott. 
127 Id., at paras. 64-78, 86-87, per Lord Hoffmann; at para. 112, per Lord Hope; at para. 139, 
per Lord Scott; at para. 150, per Baroness Hale. 
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In the course of their opinions, some of the Law Lords expressed 
concern that lower courts had not applied Reynolds in accordance with 
its spirit.128 Lord Bingham said Reynolds had been intended to give 
“much greater weight than the earlier law had done to the value of in-
formed public debate on significant public issues”, and had a 
“liberalising intention”.129 Similarly, Lord Hoffmann stated that in Rey-
nolds the House had sought to provide “greater freedom for the press to 
publish stories of genuine public interest”.130 
In Jameel the Law Lords also stated the elements of the Reynolds de-
fence more concisely. Three compendious elements were emphasized: 
1. Material of public interest. First, it must be shown that the mate-
rial published is of “public interest”.131 Although the Law Lords 
did not provide a specific definition of the “public interest” for this 
purpose, it was made clear that it is not sufficient that the material 
simply be such as to attract the interest of the public.132 Lord 
Hoffmann observed that “newspapers are not often the best judges 
of where the line should be drawn”.133 The article should be con-
sidered as a whole in deciding whether it related to a matter of 
public interest.134  
   The Law Lords emphasized the great importance of the Jameel 
article’s subject matter after the attacks of September 11, 2001; its 
tone; the absence of sensationalism or exaggeration; and its publi-
cation by a newspaper that was “respected, influential and 
unsensational”.135 Lord Bingham stated that against this back-
                                                                                                             
128 Id., at para. 38, per Lord Hoffmann; and at para. 146, per Baroness Hale. 
129 Id., at paras. 28 and 35, per Lord Bingham. 
130 Id., at para. 38, per Lord Hoffmann. 
131 Id., at para. 31, per Lord Bingham; at para. 48, per Lord Hoffmann; at para. 147, per 
Baroness Hale. 
132 Id., at para. 31, per Lord Bingham: “… [W]hat engages the interest of the public may not 
be material which engages the public interest.” 
133 Id., at para. 49, per Lord Hoffmann. Similarly, Lord Scott said (at para. 138) that news-
papers may publish information which is interesting to the public but is “trivial” or “unimportant”, 
and thus “of very little public interest”. Baroness Hale agreed, but indicated (at para. 147) that the 
standard to be met should not be so high as to amount to a test whether the public has had a “need to 
know” the information, which would be “far too limited”. 
134 Id., at para. 34, per Lord Binghamat; at para. 48, per Lord Hoffmann; at paras. 107, 111, 
per Lord Hope. 
135 Id., at paras. 2, 35, per Lord Bingham; at para. 49, per Lord Hoffmann. See also paras. 
149-150, per Baroness Hale; and para. 111, per Lord Hope. 
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ground, it was more readily acceptable that the inclusion of an in-
accurate fact could be consistent with responsible journalism.136 
2. Whether inclusion of the defamatory statement is justified. 
Second, the court is to consider whether or not the publisher’s  
inclusion of the defamatory statement in the article was justified. 
Lord Hoffman said the existence of subject matter of public inter-
est “does not allow the newspaper to drag in damaging allegations 
which serve no public purpose”.137 The “more serious the allega-
tion,” he said, “the more important it is that it should make a real 
contribution to the public interest element in the article”.138 
   Lord Hoffmann considered this test met in the case before him. 
In Jameel the inclusion of the plaintiff’s name was important to 
convey the message that Saudi cooperation with the monitoring of 
bank accounts for terrorist use “was not confined to a few compa-
nies on the fringe of Saudi society but extended to companies 
which were by any test within the heartland of the Saudi business 
world”.139 This was of significant public importance given public 
skepticism as to the extent to which the Kingdom was prepared to 
actively assist in anti-terrorism measures. Lord Scott agreed that 
the inclusion of the reference to the plaintiff’s name was an impor-
tant part of the story as a whole.140 
3. Responsible journalism. Third, it must be shown that the persons 
involved in the publication have conducted themselves in a manner 
consistent with the standard of “responsible journalism”.141 The 
Law Lords emphasized, as Lord Nicholls had in Reynolds, that 
whether the test of “responsible journalism” is met will depend on 
all the circumstances.142 Lord Hoffmann rejected the criticism that 
the concept of “responsible journalism” is too vague. He said it 
                                                                                                             
136 Id., at para. 34, per Lord Bingham. 
137 Id., at para. 51, per Lord Hoffmann. 
138 Id. 
139 Id., at para. 52, per Lord Hoffmann. 
140 Id., at paras. 139, 142, per Lord Scott. 
141 Id., at para. 32, per Lord Bingham; at paras. 53-54, per Lord Hoffmann; at paras. 105-
107, per Lord Hope; at paras. 134-135, per Lord Scott; at para. 149, per Baroness Hale. The term 
“responsible journalism” was also restated by Lord Nicholls, sitting as a member of the Privy Coun-
cil, in Bonnick v. Morris, supra, note 95, at 309, as a concise description of the journalistic conduct 
required by Reynolds. See also Loutchansky v. Times (No. 2), [2002] 1 All E.R. 652, at 666-67 
(C.A.), per Lord Phillips M.R.  
142 Jameel, id., at para. 45, per Lord Hoffmann; at para. 130, per Lord Scott. 
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was no more so than standards such as “reasonable care” used 
elsewhere in the law. He considered that greater certainty will be 
provided in a developing body of case law, and that courts may ob-
tain some guidance through reference to professional codes of 
practice.143 
The Law Lords also reaffirmed the relevance of the specific factors 
identified by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds. Several Law Lords repeated that 
these factors were not a series of hurdles that must all be met by the de-
fendant, but a number of keys or pointers that may be more or less 
indicative of the appropriate conclusion in all the circumstances of the 
case.144 It was emphasized that a Reynolds analysis must be carried out in 
a practical and flexible manner.145 Although it remains clear that whether 
the tests are met is a matter for the court, Lord Bingham stated that 
“[w]eight should ordinarily be given to the professional judgment of an 
editor or journalist in the absence of some indication that it was made in 
a casual, cavalier, slipshod or careless manner.”146 The Law Lords did, 
however, emphasize the importance of three factors: verification, the 
publisher’s honest belief in the truth of the information published, and 
efforts to contact people named in the information. 
As to verification, Lord Bingham stated that “there is no duty to pub-
lish and the public have no interest to read material which the publisher 
has not taken reasonable steps to verify”.147 To be protected, the journal-
ist should have “taken steps as a responsible journalist would take to try 
and ensure that what is published is accurate and fit for publication”.148 
As to the publisher’s belief in the truth of the information published, 
Lord Hoffmann stated that in “most cases the Reynolds defence will not 
get off the ground unless the journalist honestly and reasonably believed 
that the statement was true”.149 As to opportunity to comment, Lord Scott 
stated, “[f]airness to those whose names appear in newspapers may  
require, if it is practicable, an opportunity to comment being given to 
                                                                                                             
143 Id., at para. 55, per Lord Hoffmann. 
144 Id., at para. 33, per Lord Bingham; see also paras. 47 and 56, per Lord Hoffmann; paras. 
131, 138, per Lord Scott; para. 149, per Baroness Hale. 
145 Id., at para. 56, per Lord Hoffmann; at para. 136, per Lord Scott. 
146 Id., at para. 33, per Lord Bingham; see also para. 51, per Lord Hoffmann; and paras. 108, 
111, per Lord Hope. 
147 Id., at para. 32, per Lord Bingham. 
148 Id., at para. 32, per Lord Bingham; see also paras. 58, 79-80, per Lord Hoffmann; para. 
138, per Lord Scott; and para. 149, per Baroness Hale. 
149 Id., at para. 62, per Lord Hoffmann. 
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them and/or an opportunity to have a response published by the newspa-
per.”150 
In the course of their opinions, two of the Law Lords suggested that 
Reynolds had stretched the elastic concepts of duty and interest so far 
that Reynolds should no longer be regarded as developing a category of 
privilege at all, but a new substantive defence. Lord Hoffmann stated that 
it may be misleading to refer to the defence as a form of privilege, since 
it applies to the material in question, not the occasion upon which it has 
been published, and cannot be defeated by proof of malice “because the 
propriety of the conduct of the defendant is built into the conditions un-
der which the material is privileged”.151 Baroness Hale agreed, stating 
that a focus upon “a specific duty and a specific right to know” can easily 
lead to a “narrow and rigid approach which defeats its object”.152 Lord 
Bingham, Lord Hope and Lord Scott continued to regard the relevant 
question to be whether a sufficient reciprocal duty and interest existed in 
the mass media context.153 Lord Hoffmann also acknowledged that, “If 
the publication is in the public interest, the duty and interest are taken to 
exist.”154 
In 2008, in Seaga v. Harper,155 the Privy Council confirmed that the 
expanded privilege defence recognized in Reynolds and Jameel is not for 
the sole benefit of media organizations. The judges accepted that the de-
fence could also apply to a publication by an individual citizen to a mass 
audience. This had previously been stated by Lord Hoffmann in 
Jameel.156 
                                                                                                             
150 Id., at para. 138, per Lord Scott. 
151 Id., at para. 46, per Lord Hoffmann; see also para. 50. Similarly, in Bonnick v. Morris, 
supra, note 95, at 307, Lord Nicholls stated that “[m]atters relating to malice are to be considered in 
the context of deciding whether the publication attracted qualified privilege in accordance with the 
common law as developed by [Reynolds].” 
152 Jameel, id., at para. 146, per Baroness Hale. 
153 Id., at 376H-577A, per Lord Bingham; at 95E-F, per Lord Hope; and at 404B-C, per 
Lord Scott. 
154 Id., at para. 50, per Lord Hoffmann. 
155 Supra, note 96, on appeal from the Court of Appeal from Jamaica. 
156 Supra, note 124, at para. 54; see also para. 146, per Baroness Hale. In Reynolds, supra, 
note 42, at 229, Lord Hope commented: “No individual or organisation, such as a newspaper or any 
other section of the media, can assert that it is entitled to the benefit of qualified privilege simply 
because of who or what that individual or organisation is or what it does.” 
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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND  
The Australian High Court has based an extension of qualified privi-
lege on its views that the Commonwealth Constitution of Australia 
includes an implied guarantee of freedom to discuss and publish regard-
ing political matters, and that this implied freedom shapes and controls 
the common law.157 Publications within the scope of this freedom are not 
actionable provided that the defendant establishes that it was unaware of 
the falsity of the material published, that it was not reckless as to its truth 
or falsity, and that it was reasonable in the circumstances to publish 
without having ascertained whether the material was true or false.158 The 
Australian courts have stated that in determining whether a publication 
has been reasonable, regard should be had to factors such as whether 
steps were taken to verify the accuracy of the material published.159 
New Zealand has adopted a categorical approach to the extension of 
qualified privilege to statements to the public regarding matters of public 
interest. In Lange v. Atkinson,160 the New Zealand Court of Appeal held 
that qualified privilege applies to statements to the public about current, 
former or aspiring members of the legislature that are directly relevant to 
their capacity to meet their public responsibilities, and involve matters of 
public rather than private concern. The privilege may be defeated by 
proof of malice as traditionally defined at common law.161 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal’s decision was appealed to the 
Privy Council.162 The Privy Council acknowledged that the issue called 
for “a value judgment which depends upon local political and social con-
ditions”, and that the New Zealand court was “entitled to maintain” the 
rule it had adopted.163 It nevertheless remitted the case for reconsidera-
tion by the New Zealand court on the basis that it was appropriate to give 
it an opportunity to reconsider the issue in light of Reynolds.164 The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal declined to adopt Reynolds.165 In its view, the 
complex factual analysis introduced by Reynolds add significantly to un-
                                                                                                             
157 See the discussion in Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., [1994] HCA 46, at 
paras. 6-18, 52 (H.C.A.), per Mason C.J., Toohey and Gaudron JJ. 
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159 Id., at para. 44, per Mason C.J., Toohey and Gaudron JJ.  
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163 Id., at para. 16, per Lord Nicholls. 
164 Id., at paras. 24-25, per Lord Nicholls. 
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certainty as to the practical boundaries of defamation law, thus creating 
an increased “chilling effect” upon the media. It expressed concern that 
the Reynolds approach reduced the role of the jury in freedom of speech 
cases, which traditionally decided whether the privilege had been lost. 
Finally, it considered that the populist character of New Zealand’s politi-
cal system warranted a special status for speech with respect to political 
matters only.166 The court did accept that a consideration of the Reynolds 
factors may be relevant to an issue whether a defendant had acted reck-
lessly for the purpose of deciding whether qualified privilege is defeated 
by malice.167 
VI. CANADIAN LAW AFTER REYNOLDS 
In 2000, in Hodgson v. Canadian Newspapers Co., the Ontario Court 
of Appeal deferred a decision as to the status of Reynolds in Ontario.168 
Subsequently, in Silva v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd.,169 that Court dis-
missed an appeal from the dismissal of a libel action based on a media 
publication of tenants’ claims of impropriety against an apartment build-
ing manager. The Court stated that it should not be taken as having 
agreed with the trial judge’s view that the occasion of publication was 
privileged.170 
In Myers v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.,171 the trial judge consid-
ered Reynolds in deciding that no qualified privilege was available to a 
media defendant. She held that there had been no duty to broadcast the 
information in issue because, first, the broadcast involved an ongoing 
medical debate rather than “fresh news”; second, the subject of the 
broadcast was not of interest to other media; and third, the broadcast had 
“relied heavily on one discontented civil servant to support the hard-
hitting program thesis”.172 On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated 
only that it was not satisfied that the trial judge had made “any legal error 
of significance”.173 
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167 Id. 
168 [2000] O.J. No. 2293, 49 O.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.).  
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172 Id., at 298, per Bellamy J.  
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Similarly, the Ontario Court of Appeal declined to interfere with a re-
jection of qualified privilege by the trial judge in Leenen v. Canadian 
Broadcasting Corp.174 In Leenen (which involved the same broadcast as 
Myers), the trial judge rejected a claim of qualified privilege on the basis 
that the broadcast in issue was not published in circumstances of ur-
gency, and in his view, reported on “a crisis entirely the making of” the 
defendant.175 He also held that the broadcast was contrary to the public 
interest because of its “real potential for harm by inciting panic amongst 
patients”, and because it “seriously undermined trust and confidence in 
Canada’s health care system”.176 
In Young v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., the trial judge applied the 
Reynolds factors to determine that a newspaper article was not published 
on an occasion of qualified privilege, where the allegations in a report of 
judicial proceedings were serious, the newspaper took few steps to verify 
them, and the allegations had been demonstrated to be unfounded at the 
time of publication.177 In dismissing an appeal, the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal held that the article was not a fair and accurate report for the 
purpose of the statutory privilege available for reports of judicial pro-
ceedings. The Court did not address the subject of qualified privilege at 
common law.178 
In 2002, in Campbell v. Jones,179 a majority of the Nova Scotia Court 
of Appeal accepted that a defamatory statement communicated to the 
public at large had been published on an occasion of qualified privilege. 
In Campbell, lawyers made statements at a press conference that asserted 
as facts their clients’ complaints of racial discrimination by a police offi-
cer in detaining and searching children during the investigation of a theft. 
The majority did not decide the case on the basis of the Reynolds princi-
ples. Instead, the majority placed great weight on the particular status of 
lawyers in society, and statements in the province’s rules of professional 
conduct for lawyers that a lawyer has responsibilities “greater than those 
of a private citizen”, and “a duty to provide leadership in seeking im-
                                                                                                             
174 [2001] O.J. No. 2229, 54 O.R. (3d) 612 (Ont. C.A.). 
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provements to the legal system”.180 The majority also supported its con-
clusion on the basis that public criticism of alleged systemic 
discrimination by police must be promptly made if it is to be effective. In 
dissent, Saunders J.A. considered that the lawyers had spoken prema-
turely, and had also lost the protection of privilege because “their 
statements were high handed and careless, void of any semblance of pro-
fessional restraint or objectivity, were grossly unfair and far exceeded 
any legitimate purpose the press conference may have served”.181 Camp-
bell may be seen to make a deeper point about this area of the common 
law. The case appears to demonstrate clearly that the analytical concepts 
of duty and interest by which qualified privilege is ascertained, when 
adopted in the context of mass media cases, are required to become so 
elastic that they may be applied to justify positions as dramatically dif-
ferent as those of the majority and minority. Campbell v. Jones thus 
raised concern that the concepts of duty and interest may not be the best 
means by which to conduct a transparent and intelligible analysis of con-
flicts between free expression and individual interests in mass media 
libel cases. 
In 2007, in Cusson v. Quan,182 the Ontario Court of Appeal specifi-
cally — some might say “finally” — approved the decisions of the 
House of Lords in Reynolds and Jameel. The Court held that a media 
defendant should have a defence where it has acted in accordance with 
principles of “responsible journalism” in the public interest. As recog-
nized by Sharpe J.A., the responsible journalism defence requires that the 
media defendant “satisfy the onus of demonstrating that it did take rea-
sonable steps to ascertain the truth of the story by following the standards 
of responsible journalism when investigating, writing and publishing the 
defamatory statement”.183 The defence requires “the media to conduct 
itself in a prudent and responsible manner”,184 and should be available 
where the defendant can “show that it followed accepted standards of 
investigation and verification and formed an honest and reasonable belief 
in the truth of statements it published”.185 
                                                                                                             
180 Id., at 231, per Roscoe J.A.: “[A] lawyer faced with a patent injustice, such as the viola-
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181 Id., at 258, per Saunders J.A. 
182 Supra, note 9.  
183 Id., at para. 138, per Sharpe J.A. (C.A.). 
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Justice Sharpe described the specific factors stated in Reynolds as 
useful “indicia of whether the media were truly acting in the public inter-
est in the circumstances”.186 Justice Sharpe stated that Canadian courts 
should not adopt the House of Lords’ decisions in this field in a “slavish 
or literal fashion”, but rather should develop the law in a manner that 
best reflects Canada’s legal values and culture.187 
As outlined by Sharpe J.A., the defence will be defeated where the 
media has engaged in a lack of prudence and care falling short of the tra-
ditional malice standard. The plaintiff does not need to establish 
“deliberate or reckless falsehood” or other conduct traditionally recog-
nized as constituting malice, such as “spite or ill-will”, or an “ulterior 
purpose”.188 Justice Sharpe emphasized that the new defence constituted 
a “half-way house” between the traditional law and the alternative of 
providing the media with the full benefit of traditional qualified privi-
lege.189 He rejected the media appellants’ contention that qualified 
privilege in its traditional form should be extended to all media reports 
on matters of public interest,190 so that plaintiffs would be obliged to 
prove malice when suing on a media report on such a matter.191 He con-
sidered this to be contrary to the spirit of the Supreme Court’s rejection 
of a malice requirement in Hill, and that it would unduly minimize the 
protection of the important value of individual reputation.192 
In Reaburn v. Langen,193 the British Columbia Supreme Court held 
that a journalist’s conduct did not constitute responsible journalism 
where the journalist relied on a source with “an axe to grind”; adopted 
the source’s allegations as fact; used inflammatory phrases in his report; 
and omitted material facts from the report. Although the journalist had 
made an unsuccessful attempt to contact the plaintiffs prior to publica-
tion, the court held that this gave rise to a need to interview others who 
might have pertinent information. In addition, the court held that in these 
circumstances the defendant had exceeded the scope of any traditional 
qualified privilege at common law. 
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VII. THE DEFENCE OF RESPONSIBLE COMMUNICATION 
In 1998, in R. v. Lucas,194 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
wilful publication of defamatory statements that are known to be false 
and intended to defame is entitled to no Charter protection. Indeed, in 
Lucas, the Supreme Court held that such conduct may be subject to 
criminal sanction. Although the Court accepted that this type of defama-
tory speech falls within the scope of freedom of expression broadly 
stated in subsection 2(b) of the Charter,195 it held that its criminal prohi-
bition was a reasonable limit on the freedom under section 1.  
The protection of an individual’s reputation from wilful, defamatory 
and knowingly false attacks was recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Lucas as a pressing and substantial objective. The Court based this on the 
importance of protecting the innate dignity of the individual; the link be-
tween the individual’s reputation and his or her capacity to participate in 
Canadian society; and the need to protect individuals from long-lasting 
or permanent harm that may be caused by a defamatory attack.196 The 
Court’s acceptance of this protection as a pressing and substantial objec-
tive was also informed by a recognition of Canada’s international human 
rights commitments.197 These included the recognition in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that freedom of expression 
“carries with it special duties and responsibilities”, which include “re-
spect of the rights and reputations of others”,198 and the statement in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights that 
no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks.199 
                                                                                                             
194 Supra, note 2.  
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Having accepted that the crime of defamatory libel has a pressing 
and substantial objective, the Court held that the prohibition complied 
with the standard of minimal impairment of rights under section 1 of the 
Charter, given the obligation of the Crown to establish a subjective inten-
tion to defame. The Court stated that the deliberate publication of 
defamatory lies likely to expose a person to hatred, ridicule or contempt 
is so far removed from the core values of freedom of expression that it 
merits only scant protection as a matter of judicial policy.200 Justice 
McLachlin observed that such expression may have some value to the 
extent that it focuses attention on issues of public concern, but that value 
is low, and is reduced further by the fact that public attention can be fo-
cused on issues without intentionally inflicting harm on the reputation of 
a person through the publication of known falsehoods.201 
The Supreme Court thus established in Lucas that defamatory state-
ments known to be false and intended to defame are entitled to no 
protection. It remained for the Supreme Court to consider the more diffi-
cult problem of the consistency with Charter values of the common law 
applicable to other types of defamatory statements. It may have been 
thought, after Hill, that the Court would not conduct a rigorous examina-
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tion of the common law of libel. Yet Hill was a case of malicious libel, 
arguably either within, or very close to, the class of defamatory speech 
held to be entirely beyond Charter protection in Lucas. Hill also ex-
pressly left open the status of defamatory publications by mass media.202 
It may also be argued that in Hill, the Court was asked to do too much in 
the submission that it should adopt the Sullivan “absence of malice” 
standard. In the absence of a more moderate alternative, the Court may 
have done less than it might have. In any event, the refined and searching 
analysis of free expression issues developed by the Court over the last 25 
years made it inevitable that such an approach would ultimately have to 
be brought to bear upon more difficult types of defamatory speech than 
were considered in Hill and Lucas. 
The Supreme Court first did so in 2008, in WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simp-
son,203 by reviewing the law applicable to defamatory statements of 
comment on subjects of public interest. In libel law, a statement of com-
ment, as distinguished from a statement of fact, is characterized by an 
element of subjectivity generally incapable of proof, while a statement of 
fact is capable of being determined to be accurate or not.204 Comment 
most commonly includes expressions of opinion, but may also extend to 
inferences of fact that are inherently debatable on the facts of the case. 
Whether a statement is one of comment or fact is to be determined from 
the perspective of the reasonable viewer or reader.205 It has long been 
established that the defence of fair comment may be available for de-
famatory statements of comment, as distinct from statements of fact, 
made on matters of public interest, without malice, on the basis of accu-
rate facts, and which are “fair”.  
In WIC Radio, the Supreme Court held that the established common 
law elements of the defence are consistent with Charter values, subject to 
the clarification that “fairness” for the purpose of the defence is to be 
judged on the objective standard of whether any person could honestly 
make the comment on the basis of the facts referred to by the person 
making the comment.206 This is to be distinguished from a concept of 
“fairness” in the sense of correctness or approximate accuracy. It will be 
seen that the latitude for comments that any person could honestly make, 
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as distinguished from a requirement that comments be reasonably cor-
rect, provides a wider scope of protection for comment on matters of 
public interest. As Binnie J. put it more concisely, “We live in a free 
country where people have as much right to express outrageous and ri-
diculous opinions as moderate ones.”207 
In its recent decision in Grant v. Torstar Corp.,208 the Supreme Court 
turned to the common law applicable to defamatory statements of fact 
which relate to subjects of legitimate public interest and, unlike those 
stated in Lucas to be beyond the law’s protection, are not knowingly 
false. The Court squarely considered the matter in accordance with prin-
ciples of freedom of expression analysis.  
It is well established that the values underlying the Charter freedom 
of expression are, first, intelligent democratic self-government; second, 
the determination of truth through the open exchange of communication; 
and third, persons’ individual self-fulfillment as both speakers and listen-
ers.209 In Grant, the Court accepted that the publication of a defamatory 
fact which is not known to be false, and which relates to a subject matter 
of public interest, may advance the first two free expression values. It 
may do so by, first, facilitating “freewheeling” and productive debate on 
matters of democratic governance. Second, the publication may assist in 
the determination of the full truth on matters of public interest gener-
ally.210 Only the third value underlying free expression, the fulfillment of 
the individual’s desire to express oneself, was considered to have insuffi-
cient weight to warrant protection for defamatory statements.211 In light 
of this analysis, McLachlin C.J.C. made plain that the more conservative 
language of the Court in Hill should be read carefully. She said the 
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statement of Cory J. in Hill that “defamatory statements are very tenu-
ously related to the core values which underlie s. 2(b)” must be read in 
the factual context of that case.212 
In Grant, the Supreme Court also continued to be mindful of its es-
tablished principle that in assessing the consistency of the common law 
with values underlying the Charter, the common law should reflect full 
and equal respect for all of those values.213 A hierarchical approach, pre-
ferring some values over others, is to be avoided.214 Having found 
potential free expression values in defamatory speech relating to subjects 
of legitimate public interest that is not known by the speaker to be false, 
it remained for the Court to take into account the “vital”215 value of pro-
tecting individuals’ reputations and the “innate dignity of the 
individual”.216 It restated its acknowledgment in Lucas that there is an 
“integral link between reputation and the fruitful participation of an indi-
vidual in Canadian society”, both for private citizens and individuals 
participating in public life.217 The Court also restated that defamation law 
may protect individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy.218 
For the Court in Grant, the tipping point in this balance was that at 
which, assuming a case involving a publication relating to a matter of 
legitimate public interest, legal and practical technicalities may intervene 
to give the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant. The Court 
repeatedly expressed concern for the position of a journalist “who has 
checked sources and is satisfied that a statement is substantially true”;219 
who wishes to report “facts which a reasonable person would accept as 
reliable and which are relevant and important to public debate”;220 and 
who has “a reasonable certainty” of the truth of the report.221 Unless a 
defence is available on the basis of reasonable verification of the state-
ment at the time of publication, the defendant may be defeated by an 
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inability to prove the substantial truth of the statement in a court of law 
on some date far in the future,222 by reason of the unavailability of wit-
nesses, an inability to meet the standards of the law of evidence, or some 
other practical impediment. In such circumstances the plaintiff may un-
fairly benefit from the imposition of a “standard of perfection”.223 Where 
the statement in issue relates to a subject of public interest and was relia-
bly verified at the time of publication, the plaintiff’s success on such a 
basis unduly restricts freedom of expression in the particular case. The 
legal regime which allows this will also inevitably stifle the communica-
tion of reliable statements on matters of public interest in other cases.224 
While the Supreme Court appreciated that the concepts of duty and 
interest have for some time been used by courts to make qualified privi-
lege available to mass media communications in an “ad hoc and 
incremental way”,225 the Court considered that the threshold “remains 
high”226 and “the criteria for reciprocal duty and interest” remained “un-
clear”.227 As observed above regarding the split between majority and 
minority in Campbell v. Jones, the concepts of duty and interest are po-
tentially so elastic that they may be applied in mass media cases to reach 
starkly opposed results. In Grant, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
the concepts of duty and interest in traditional qualified privilege analysis 
involving job references, police reports and the like “are definable with 
some precision and involve a genuine reciprocity”, while a “reciprocal 
duty and interest involved in a journalistic publication to the world at 
large, by contrast, is largely notional”.228 
The Supreme Court accordingly dispensed with traditional qualified 
privilege analysis, and instead formulated a test for a new defence of “re-
sponsible communication” specifically focused on the concepts of public 
interest and responsibility in mass media communications.229 The de-
fence was accordingly held to apply where a defamatory statement, first, 
relates to a subject of public interest, and second, has been responsibly 
verified by the defendant.230 
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The publication in issue will relate to a matter of public interest if, 
read broadly and as a whole, it relates to a subject in which a segment of 
the community would have a genuine interest in receiving information.231 
The potential subject matter may thus be wide-ranging, including poli-
tics, science and the arts, the environment, religion or morality.232 Few 
potential subjects are clearly excluded from potential consideration, al-
though the Court made clear that subjects of public interest do not extend 
to matters of mere curiosity or prurient interest, or in which the person 
concerned has a reasonable expectation of privacy.233 
A publication of a defamatory fact will be responsible if it is based 
upon information that “a reasonable person would accept as reliable”, 
even though it may not be possible, at a later stage in a courtroom, to 
prove the truth of the fact on the basis of admissible evidence.234 To meet 
the standard of reliability the defendant must have acted carefully.235 The 
degree of care required will vary from case to case. The more serious the 
defamatory statement, the “more thorough” the efforts at verification 
must be.236 If a defendant’s source of information may be untrustworthy, 
has a bias or “axe to grind”, or wishes to be a confidential source, there 
may be a need to take other steps to verify a statement.237 In most cases, 
it will be “inherently unfair” to publish the defamatory statement without 
giving the target an opportunity to respond, although the significance of 
this factor will vary in accordance with “the degree to which fulfilling its 
dictates would actually have bolstered the fairness and accuracy of the 
report”.238 A great public importance or urgency of the publication may 
also be taken into account in deciding whether the publication was re-
sponsible.239 If the defendant has acted maliciously, however, the defence 
cannot be available, since a defendant acting with malice “has by defini-
tion not acted responsibly”.240 As the assessment of reliability is 
predominantly factual, it is for the trier of fact to determine. 
Chief Justice McLachlin observed that under the former law, the 
practical difficulties faced by defendants, who were required to be certain 
at the point of publication that they could prove the truth of a defamatory 
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statement at a later trial, raised the spectre that “defamation lawsuits, real 
or threatened”, could “be a weapon by which the wealthy and privileged 
stifle the information and debate essential to a free society”.241 She was 
equally cognizant, however, that in Canadian life a defendant mass media 
publisher may itself have significant power. Although McLachlin C.J.C. 
made clear that the new defence will be available to anyone who pub-
lishes on matters of public interest responsibly,242 she also stated that it is 
“vital that the media act responsibly in reporting facts on matters of pub-
lic concern, holding themselves to the highest journalistic standards”.243 
Chief Justice McLachlin accepted that libel law serves as “one of the 
comparatively few checks upon [the media’s] great power”.244 
VIII. THE CANADIAN ADOPTION OF “REPORTAGE” 
It has long been a fundamental principle of defamation law that a de-
fendant cannot defend a libel action on the basis that the defendant has 
only repeated what someone else has said.245 This “repetition rule” has 
been adopted to deal with the possibility that a person intending to de-
fame another may seek to frame a defamatory statement in an indirect 
manner, in the hope of avoiding civil liability. It has been observed that 
the repetition rule “in essence, prevents a defendant from hiding behind 
the fact that he is only repeating what others have alleged. He can ac-
cordingly not justify the libel by proving that the allegations have been 
made, but only by proving that they are true.”246 
A number of recent United Kingdom cases, in the wake of the devel-
opments discussed above regarding media privilege, have accepted that 
certain reports of defamatory allegations, while nevertheless defamatory 
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by repetition, may be privileged.247 “Reportage” has been coined as a 
name for this defence. In the United Kingdom, the defence of “report-
age” may be available where two tests are met. First, the information 
reported must be in the public interest. Although this may include infor-
mation alleging very serious misconduct, it may not go so far as to 
include information that is considered to be of a personal and scurrilous 
nature.248 Second, the thrust of the report as a whole, judged objectively 
and in all the circumstances, must have the effect of reporting only the 
fact that the statement was made, rather than its truth. As such, the jour-
nalist must not have adopted the information, and must have reported the 
story in a fair, disinterested and neutral way.249 The publication must also 
generally meet the standards of “responsible journalism” as articulated in 
the case law. If these standards are met, it is not necessary that the jour-
nalist have taken steps to verify the truth of the information reported.250 
In Jameel v. Wall Street Journal,251 the House of Lords accepted that 
the defence of “reportage” may be available to mass media in certain 
cases. Lord Hoffmann stated that the defence of “reportage” may apply 
in cases “in which the public interest lies simply in the fact that the 
statement was made”, provided that it is “clear that the publisher does 
not subscribe to any belief in its truth”.252 Baroness Hale also referred to 
this, although she cautioned that if the publisher intends only to report 
what others have said, and does not believe the information to be true, 
“he would be well advised to make this clear … In any case, the tone in 
which the information is conveyed will be relevant to whether or not the 
publisher behaved responsibly in passing it on”.253 
American defamation law has recognized a defence of neutral “re-
portage”. In order for the defence to be established under American law, 
it has been stated that (1) the defendant must be a responsible, prominent 
organization; (2) the plaintiff must be a public figure; (3) the report must 
be accurate and disinterested; and (4) the accusations must be newswor-
thy as having been made in a current controversy on a sensitive issue. It 
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has been observed that these criteria have been met in relatively few 
cases.254 
In Moises v. Canadian Newspaper Co., the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal held that no defence is available in Canada for “neutral report-
age” of defamatory statements made by others. The court rejected an 
argument that a publication is made an occasion of qualified privilege 
where the words published are a “fair report” on a matter of public inter-
est.255 The contrary was suggested in the 1989 Ontario Superior Court 
case of Parsons v. Windsor Star,256 but that decision was subsequently 
criticized in the same court.257 
In Grant v. Torstar Corp., the Supreme Court of Canada recognized 
“reportage” as a type of responsible communication. The Supreme Court 
held that the defence will apply to a report which fairly reports both sides 
of a dispute which is itself a matter of public interest.258 To qualify for 
protection, the report must, first, attribute the statement to a person, pref-
erably identified; second, indicate expressly or implicitly that the truth 
has not been verified; third, set out both sides of the dispute fairly; and, 
fourth, provide the context in which the statements were made.259 
IX. CONCLUSION: THREE PILLARS 
Lucas, Grant and WIC Radio may be seen as placing Canadian libel 
law on a foundation of three pillars: first, as established in Lucas,260 know-
ingly false and malicious defamation is beyond the protection of the law; 
second, as established in Grant,261 defamatory statements of fact which 
relate to subjects of legitimate public interest and are not known to be false 
at the time of publication will be protected if they constitute reliable in-
formation published responsibly; and third, as established in WIC Radio,262 
defamatory statements of comment on matters of public interest need not 
be responsible, as long as a person could have honestly expressed them on 
the relevant facts. These are foundational principles that may properly be 
said to be emblematic of a free and democratic society that values both 
freedom of expression and the protection of the individual. 
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